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Abstract
A classic characterization of competitive equilibria views them as feasible allocations maximizing a
weighted sum of utilities. It has been applied to establish fundamental properties of the equilibrium
notion, such as existence, determinacy, and computability. However, it fails for economies with missing
ﬁnancial markets.
We give such a characterization for economies with missing ﬁnancial markets, by an amended social
welfare function. Its parameters capture both the relative importance of households’ welfare–the classic
weights–as well as the disagreements among them as to the value of the missing markets.
As a by-product, we identify the dimension of the set of interior equilibrium allocations.
Keywords: incomplete markets, social welfare function, manifold
JEL Classiﬁcation: D52, D61.
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If no ﬁnancial markets are missing, following Lange (1942) and Allais (1943), interior allocations of given
resources are competitive equilibria if and only if they solve the program maxΣxh=r Wδ(x)f or some strictly
positive δ, with Wδ being the social welfare function1
Wδ(x): =Σ δhuh(xh) (1)
The parameters δ in Lange’s social welfare function capture the relative importance of households’ wel-
fare. This characterization has been applied to establish fundamental properties of the equilibrium notion–
existence, Negishi (1960) and Bewley (1969), determinacy with inﬁnitely lived households, Kehoe and Levine
(1985), and computability, Mantel (1971).
If some ﬁnancial markets are missing as in Radner (1972), however, this equivalence fails: some interior
competitive equilibria need not solve the program maxΣxh=r Wδ(x) for any strictly positive δ. Moreover,
no natural social welfare function W has been found that would rescue this implication.
We extend the characterization to economies with some missing ﬁnancial markets, by amending the social
welfare function. Thus interior allocations of given resources are competitive equilibria if and only if they
solve the program maxΣxh=r Wδ,µ(x)f or some parameters δ ∈ D,µ ∈ M living in certain spaces, with
Wδ,µ being the social welfare function
W(x): =Σ δhuh(xh) − Σµh · xh
1 (2)
Here, the social evaluation of allocations is described by the usual weights δ on households’ welfare, and
by new charges µ on their future consumption. The parameter δ is interpreted classically, whereas µ is
interpreted as the ”disagreement” among households as to the ”value” of the ”missing ﬁnancial markets,”
as justiﬁed below.
Why does it fail, the equivalence of competitive equilibria and maxima of (1), if some ﬁnancial markets
are missing? On the one hand, any allocation x that maximizes this is Pareto eﬃcient. Indeed, if y were
Pareto superior to x, i.e. (uh(yh)) > (uh(xh)), then Wδ(y) >W δ(x) for any δ   0, so x could not
be a maximum for any δ   0. On the other hand, some allocations x that are competitive equilibria
of incomplete ﬁnancial markets are Pareto ineﬃcient. Indeed, for almost every initial allocation, every
competitive equilibrium allocation is Pareto ineﬃcient—for an exposition of this well known fact, see Magill
and Quinzii (1996).2 So some competitive equilibria fail to maximize (1) for any δ   0.
We explain in what sense the parameter µ is the ”disagreement” among households as to the ”value”
of the ”missing ﬁnancial markets,” by clarifying each of these terms. By ”missing ﬁnancial markets” we
mean the orthogonal complement a⊥ of the span of the existing ﬁnancial instruments a. By ”value” of
the missing ﬁnancial markets we mean a linear functional v : a⊥ → R. The Riesz representation theorem
1Lange characterizes Pareto optima in this way. So the above characterization follows from the two welfare theorems. (Lange
(1942) is aware of the ﬁrst one, while Allais (1953) is among the ﬁrst to rigourously prove the second one.)
2If there are multiple goods and enough missing ﬁnancial markets, even the equilibrium use of the existing ﬁnancial markets is
generically Pareto ineﬃcient, as shown by Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1986), who pioneer the application of transversality
to equilibrium welfare. The intuition for this is due to Stiglitz (1982). A sweeping generalization is in Citanna, Kajii and
Villanacci (1998).
1or separating hyperplane theorem imply that any linear functional on a ﬁnite dimensional inner product
space can be represented uniquely as the inner product against a unique element of the vector space–call this
element ˆ v ∈ a⊥, so that v(m)=m · ˆ v. If each household thinks such a value vh, the disagreement is then
the diﬀerences from the mean, µh := ˆ vh − mean(ˆ v1,..., ˆ vH). When so deﬁned, the disagreement µ =( µh)
satisﬁes two properties: (i) µh ∈ a⊥, because it is a linear combination of points ˆ vh ∈ a⊥ in a vector space,
and (ii) Σµh =0 , because these are diﬀerences from the mean. In sum, imagining that each household has
its own vh, an opinion as to the value of the missing ﬁnancial markets, then this is the sense of the new
parameter in our social welfare function (1)—a matrix µ =( µh) satisfying conditions (i), (ii).
Our main conclusions are about the following set, given some smooth preferences u ‘a la Debreu (1972),
some state-contingent resources r, and some ﬁnitely many ﬁnancial instruments a. Namely, the set X of
all interior competitive equilibrium allocations arising from some income distribution Σeh = r compatible
with the resources.
The ﬁrst result (theorem 1) is that an allocation x   0i sa nequilibrium allocation if and only if it
solves the program maxΣxh=r Wδ,µ(x) for some (δ,µ) ∈ D × M, where
D :=












We see that the ”welfare” parameter δ is normalized in a standard way, and the ”disagreement” parameter
µ reﬂects properties (i) and (ii) above.





µh(x)=ˆ vh − mean(ˆ v1,..., ˆ vH)w i t hˆ vh :=
Dx1uh(xh)
Dx0uh(xh)
Thus δh is the inverse of the marginal utility of present consumption, as usual, and µ is, as interpreted
above, the disagreement among households as to the value of the missing ﬁnancial markets, where each
household’s ”value” ˆ vh is concretized as the marginal rates at which it substitutes consumption in future
states for consumption in the present state. Here, the abstract notion of ”value” as a linear functional
v : a⊥ → R is made concrete by the idea of marginal willingness to pay as ∆  → ∆·MRS,the inner product
of the inﬁnitesimal change ∆ in future consumption against the marginal rates of substitution MRS.
The third result (theorem 2) is that the relation x ↔ (δ,µ)b e tween X ↔ D × M is a bijection, smooth
in both directions. This implies immediately that the dimension of X equals the dimension of D × M,
which is easily shown to be (H − 1)(1 + m) where m is the number of missing ﬁnancial markets. This
nests a well known fact about complete markets, where m =0:the interior Pareto optima (which are X
by the two welfare theorems) have dimension H − 1, cf. proof of 5.2.4 in Balasko (1988).
We restrict attention to an exchange economy that, for simplicity, has a single good per state and assets
paying oﬀ in terms of it. However, our results extend to the case of multiple goods per state and any
assets paying oﬀ linearly in the goods’ prices, with the social welfare function and arguments being almost
identical. For this more general setting, Tirelli (2008) develops a parameterization of equilibria, alternate to
the x ↔ (δ,µ) here, emphasizing their geometry over the social welfare function they optimize. He then
2applies the parameterization to derive the constrained ineﬃciency of equilibria in the sense of Geanakoplos
and Polemarchakis (1986).
By way of application, we suggest the problem of computing equilibria of incomplete ﬁnancial markets.
This problem has its analogue with complete ﬁnancial markets, for which many algorithms and their con-
vergence properties are available. One such algorithm is Mantel’s (1971), a dynamic system in the welfare






where xδ solves the δ-program maxΣxh=r Wδ(x) and pδ is its Kuhn-Tucker multiplier, with Wδ as in (1).
Clearly, a rest point ˙ δ =0corresponds to an allocation xδ that is resource-feasible, and Marshallian-optimal
relative to prices pδ, so that xδ ∈ X. He shows that if the utilities deﬁne excess demands for which goods
are gross-substitutes—known to imply unique equilibrium prices—and are homothetic, then this dynamic
system is globally stable. Our characterization suggests that a natural idea for computing equilibria of
incomplete ﬁnancial markets a, would be to amend his dynamic system to one in the parameters δ,µ, and
amend his condition for global stability.
The paper proceed as follows. Section 2 spells out the model and assumptions. Section 3 develops the
characterization. Section 4 reﬁnes the characterization, computing the dimension of X. Section 5 contains
the more formalistic and less insightful proofs.
2 Economy and equilibria
Primitives There are h =1 ,...,H households who know the present state of nature 0 but are uncertain
as to which future state of nature s =1 ,...,S will occur. In each state a nonstorable good is available for
consumption, and in state 0 there are assets j =1 ,...,J available for trade.
Real economy The resource r ∈ R
S+1
++ of the good is state-contingent, and the income distribution




++ :Σ eh = r

. Each asset j pays oﬀ in the future
a state-contingent amount aj ∈ RS of the good, summarized by a matrix a ∈ RS×J.3 Asset markets are
complete if span(a)=RS, incomplete otherwise.
Markets Markets specify that each asset j is tradeable at a price of qj units of the good in the
present, by specifying q = p a (row) for some state prices p ∈ RS
++.Q⊂ RJ denotes such asset prices.
Households are free to trade any amount θh
j ∈ R of any asset: buy θh
j > 0, sell θh
j < 0, or neither θh
j =0 .
Trades of asset j clear if Σθh







Remark 1 The payoﬀs a of the assets and the resources r of the good are ﬁxed throughout the paper.
This is important in interpreting the dimensions reported in section 4.
3All vectors are column vectors, unless stated otherwise.










The asset trade is any function θ : Q × R
S+1
++ → RJ from asset prices and one’s income. Each household
has an asset trade θh, by which it transforms its income into consumption, xh(q,eh): =eh + Wθ h(q,eh).
Trades are optimal if there is a utility function uh : R
S+1
+ → R solving
uh(xh(q,eh)) = supuh(X(q,eh))
Deﬁnition 1 (q,e) ∈ Q × Ω is an equilibrium if asset trades clear, Σθh(q,eh)=0 . It is a no-trade
equilibrium if θh(q,eh)=0 for every h.
We denote by E,T,X the sets of equilibria, no-trade equilibria, equilibrium allocations–an equilibrium
allocation is any x for which (q,x) ∈ T for some q ∈ Q.
2.1 Assumptions
Assumption 1 In the economy, the income distribution is strictly positive (e ∈ Ω) and no assets are
redundant (a has rank J).
Assumption 2 Trades by h are optimal with respect to utility uh.
Assumption 3 uh is continuous, C2 in R
S+1
++ , strictly increasing (∀x ∈ R
S+1
++ ,Du h(x)   0), strictly
concave (∀x ∈ R
S+1
++ ,D2uh(x) is negative deﬁnite), and boundary averse (∀x  ∈ R
S+1
++ ,u h(x) ≥ uh(x ) ⇒
x ∈ R
S+1



















It is instrumental because of a well known implication of the assumptions, that the optimal asset trades
θh(q,eh) are C1 and characterized as the unique solution of
∇ha − q =0 ( θ)
while evaluating ∇h at eh + Wθh.
3 Equilibrium allocations characterized
We characterize equilibria as solutions of the program maxΣxh=r Wδ,µ(x) for some parametric social welfare
function Wδ,µ, where the parameters satisfy a speciﬁc restriction, (δ,µ) ∈ P. The social welfare function in
question, given parameters (δ,µ) ∈ RH × RHS, is
Wδ,µ(x): =Σ δhuh(xh) − Σµh · xh (5)
4where µh =( 0 ,µ h) ∈ RS+1 simply prepends to the row vector µh ac o ordinate with value zero.
Key to the characterization is a function (δ(x),µ(x)) from income distributions Ω to the ambient space
RH × RHS, given by
δh(x)=
t
D0uh µh(x)=t(∇h − ∇) (6)
where





by assumption 3. Since the dependence of ∇h on xh, and of t,∇ on x is understood, it is being omitted.
In a nutshell, the logic of the characterization has two steps. In the ”necessity step” (proposition 1), we
show that if x   0i sa nequilibrium allocation, then it solves the program for (δ,µ)=( δ(x),µ(x)), the value
of (6) at the equilibrium allocation, and in turn (δ(x),µ(x)) satisﬁes speciﬁc restrictions. It is then natural
to deﬁne, independently of the social welfare function (5) or the function (6), the subset P ⊂ R
H ×RHS of
all points satisfying these restrictions. In the ”suﬃciency step” (proposition 2), we show that an allocation
x that solves the program for some (δ,µ) ∈ P is an equilibrium allocation, and in turn (δ,µ)m ust be
(δ(x),µ(x)), the value of (6) at the maximum. We include all proofs in the body of the paper because they
are insightful and simple.
Proposition 1 (necessity) If x   0 is an equilibrium allocation, then
• (A) it solves the program maxΣxh=r Wδ,µ(x)f o r the (δ,µ)=( δ(x),µ(x)) in (6)
• (B) (δ(x),µ(x)) satisﬁes the restrictions δ(x)   0,Σ 1
δh(x) =1 and µh(x) ∈ a⊥,Σµh(x)=0 .
Proof. Part A Feasibility: Σxh = r holds because x is an equilibrium allocation. Maximality: By
the easy half of Kuhn-Tucker, it suﬃces that x maximizes
Wδ,µ(x) − ρ · Σxh
for some ρ ∈ RS+1, say, ρ := t(1,∇)   0w i t ht,∇ as in (7).
Note Wδ,µ(x) − t(1,∇) · Σxh is concave, given δ = δ(x)   0. So it is maximized at x   0, the
equilibrium allocation, so long as its derivative is zero there. Its derivative with respect to xh
0 is
δhD0uh − t
By the hypothesis that δ is the δ(x)i n (6), this is zero indeed. Its derivative with respect to xh
1 where
1 = {1,...,S} is
δhD1uh − µh − t∇
By the hypothesis that δ,µ are the δ(x),µ(x)i n (6), this is
t




5Recalling deﬁnition (4), this is zero indeed.
Part B δ(x) ∈ D : Deﬁnitions (6), (7) immediately imply the 1
δh = D0u
h
t sum to 1; also, δh > 0b y
assumption 3; therefore, δ(x) ∈ D. µ(x) ∈ M :I tsuﬃces that (∇h−∇)h ∈ M, since t =Σ D0ui > 0i s just
a uniform rescaling. That the (∇h−∇) sum to 0 is immediate from the deﬁnition of ∇ := 1
HΣ∇h as the
average. (Up to here, the proof does not require the hypothesis of equilibrium.) That ∇h −∇∈a⊥ follows
from asset trades, which are optimal in equilibrium hence satisfy ∇ha − q =0 a sn oted in (θ). Averaging
these equations, ∇a−q =0 . Subtracting the latter from the former, (∇h −∇)a =0 , i.e. ∇h −∇∈a⊥.
Let us deﬁne the sets
D :=













Whereas these sets are deﬁned independently of the auxiliary function (6), conclusion (B) does refer to the
auxiliary function (6). Yet it is possible to paraphrase conclusion (B) in terms of these sets: (δ(x),µ(x)) ∈
D × M. Putting together (A) and (B) therefore yields the
Corollary 1 If x   0 is an equilibrium allocation, then it solves the program maxΣxh=r Wδ,µ(x) for
some (δ,µ) ∈ D × M.4
A natural conjecture is whether the converse is true, and it is:
Proposition 2 (suﬃciency) If x ≥ 0 solves the program maxΣxh=r Wδ,µ(x) for some (δ,µ) ∈ D × M,
then
• (A) it is an equilibrium allocation
• (B) (δ,µ)i s necessarily the (δ(x),µ(x)) in (6)—in particular, x   0.
Proof. Part B That x ∈ argmax   0f ollows from the boundary aversion in assumption 3 and δ   0.
Further, the harder half of Kuhn-Tucker implies that x maximizes
Wδ,µ(x) − ρ · Σxh
for some ρ+ =( ρ0,ρ) ∈ RS+1. (Here we use that Wδ,µ is concave and Σxh = r linear, so that the
constraint qualiﬁcation automatically holds.) Since x   0, the derivative must be zero:
δhDuh − µh = ρ+ (9)





0 =0 . This and the hypothesis δ ∈ D (so that Σ 1




4The P to which the introduction to this section alludes is here recognized as P = D × M.
6This states δ is the δ(x)i n (6). And equation (12) implies for states 1 = {1,...,S} that
µh = δhD1uh − ρ =( Σ D0ui)∇h − ρ
on substituting conclusion (10) and deﬁnition (4). This and the hypothesis µ ∈ M (so that Σµh = 0),
when averaged, imply 0 = 1
HΣµh =( Σ D0ui)∇−ρ hence ρ =( Σ D0ui)∇, which substituted back implies
µh =( Σ D0ui)(∇h − ∇) (11)
This states µ is the µ(x)i n (6).
Part A By deﬁnition of equilibrium allocation, we are to show that (q,x) ∈ T is a no-trade equilibrium,
i.e. θh(q,xh)=0 , for some asset prices q ∈ Q. By (θ), this is equivalent to ∇ha − q =0 while evaluating
∇h at the xh + W0=xh, for some q ∈ Q. It suﬃces that this be true for, say, q := ∇a with ∇ as in
(7). That is, it suﬃces that
∇ha − ∇a =0 (12)
while evaluating at xh. Now, (12) is equivalent to (∇h − ∇)a =0 is equivalent to (∇h − ∇) ∈ a⊥ is
equivalent to (ΣD0ui)(∇h−∇) ∈ a⊥ (since the vector space a⊥ is closed under rescalings by (ΣD0ui)  = 0).
Thus it suﬃces that (ΣD0ui)(∇h − ∇) ∈ a⊥ while evaluating at xh. This is true, because of conclusion
(11) and the hypothesis µ ∈ M (so that µh ∈ a⊥).
Putting together part (A) of propositions 1 and 2 yields our characterization of equilibria:5
Theorem 1 Suppose x   0. Then it is an equilibrium allocation iﬀ it solves maxΣxh=r Wδ,µ(x) for some
(δ,µ) ∈ D × M.
We remark that if asset markets are complete, then a⊥ = {0} and M = {0} and µ =0 necessarily,
making Wδ,µ(x)=Σ δhuh(xh). In particular, if asset markets are complete, theorem 1 simply concludes that
x is an equilibrium allocation if and only if it solves maxΣxh=r Σδhuh(xh)f or some δ ∈ D—the classical
characterization.
As an aside, there is a separate characterization, which does not even refer to social welfare functions.
The proof is relegated to the appendix, and simply recycles the arguments above.
Corollary 2 Suppose x ∈ Ω. Then it is an equilibrium allocation iﬀ (∇h − ∇) |x∈ a⊥ for every h.
Likewise, if asset markets are complete, then a⊥ = {0} and this merely concludes that x is an
equilibrium allocation if and only if it all ∇h are equal (to the average)—a classical characterization.
Remark 2 (multiple goods) If there are multiple goods per state and assets pay oﬀ in the num´ eraire,
theorem 1 holds exactly as stated, so long as the social welfare function is amended as follows:
Σδhuh(xh) − Σµh · xh
num´ eraire in future
5Part (B) of proposition 1 may seem superﬂuous, but in fact was the identiﬁer of (δ,µ) ∈ D×M as this theorem’s necessary
and suﬃcient condition. Part (B) of proposition 2 will play a role in the next section.
74D imension of equilibrium allocations
Here, we state a version of the characterization that is stronger by the fact it claims the above relation
x ↔ (δ,µ)i s a diﬀeomorphism–a bijection, smooth in both directions. If the utilities are time separable
u(x)=u0(x0)+u1(x1), and we think of the inverse of (6), we see δ determines the distribution of present
consumption x0, and, given δ, µ determines the distribution of future consumption x1.
By way of caveat, the dimensions reported here are to be interpreted for ﬁxed asset payoﬀs a and
resources r.
Theorem 2 The no-trade equilibria T are diﬀeomorphic to D × M.6 In fact, a global chart is (6). Thus
T is a smooth manifold of dimension (H − 1)(S − J +1 ) .
To see why this is the dimension, note that T,D × M must have equal dimension, being diﬀeomorphic,
while that of D × M is easy to compute. It is dim(D)+dim(M); clearly, glancing at (8) we see dim(D)=
H − 1; and dim(M)=( H − 1)(S − J), because choosing µ1,...,H−1 from a⊥ (itself of dimension S − J)
uniquely determines µH ∈ a⊥ as µH = −Σh<Hµh. Thus
dimT =d i mD +d i mM =( H − 1)+( H − 1)(S − J)=( H − 1)(S − J +1 )
Theorem 2 nests a well known fact about complete markets, where S = J : the interior Pareto optima
(which are X by the two welfare theorems) have dimension H − 1, cf. proof of 5.2.4 in Balasko (1988).
Corollary 3 The equilibria E are a (H−1)J−vector bundle on T, hence a smooth (H−1)(S+1)-manifold.
To see why this is the dimension, note that E, as locally the Cartesian product of T and a vector space
of dimension (H − 1)J, must have dimension
dimE =d i mT +( H − 1)J =theorem 2=( H − 1)(S +1 )
Corollary 3 agrees with a well known fact about complete markets, where S = J : the equilibrium
manifold given ﬁxed resources has dimension (H − 1)(#goods), cf. chapter 5 in Balasko (1988).
Remark 3 (multiple goods) If there are multiple goods per state and assets pay oﬀ in the num´ eraire,
theorem 2 holds exactly as stated–so the dimension of T stays the same.
5 Remaining proofs
Starting from the well known fact7 that
Proposition 3 E is a smooth manifold.
our argument applies the very useful
6Note, though the statement is about T instead of X, it this equivalent, as shown by the inverses (q,x) → x,x → (∇,x).
7Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1986), section 6.
8Lemma 1 (3.2.1 in Balasko (1988)) Let φ : X → Y, ψ : Y → X be smooth maps between smooth
manifolds making φ◦ψ the identity. Then ψ(Y ) is a smooth submanifold of X diﬀeomorphic to Y, and
φ |ψ(Y ): ψ(Y ) → Y is a diﬀeomorphism.
where
X is E
Y is D × M















where ∇ := 1
HΣ∇h is the average of the ∇h(x)i n (4) and
x := argmax
x∈Ω
Σ(δhuh(xh) − µhxh) (15)
and µh := (0,µ h).8
Lemma 2 φ and ψ are well deﬁned and satisfy the hypothesis in lemma 1.
Proof. of lemma 2. φ is well-deﬁned, i.e. φ(q,e) ∈ D × M. The proof of part (B) of proposition 1
applies verbatim.
ψ is well-deﬁned, i.e. ψ(δ,µ) exists, is unique, and in E. The argmax x exists because the objective
in (15) is continuous and Ωc ompact. The argmax x is unique because, ﬁrst, argmax   0 from the Inada
condition in assumption 3, and, second, the objective is strictly concave in the interior from the concavity
condition in assumption 3. It remains to show (∇a,x) ∈ E. We show this by showing (∇a,x) ∈ T, i.e.
θh(∇a,xh)=0 . The proof of part (A) of proposition 2 applies verbatim.
φ ◦ ψ = id Given (δ,µ), deﬁne (q,x): =ψ(δ,µ);we want φ(q,x)=( δ,µ).By part (B) of proposition
2, (δ,µ) equals the right side of (13) evaluated at allocation x = argmax = ψ2. Also, the right side
of (13) evaluated at allocation x + Wθ(q,x),is the deﬁnition of φ(q,x), for any (q,x) ∈ E. So the right
sides agree, and therefore (δ,µ)=φ(q,x), if both allocations agree, i.e. if asset trades θ(q,x)=0 . Now,
θ(q,x)=0 holds because both θ(∇a,argmax) = 0—as shown in the proof of part (A) of proposition 2—and
(q,x)=( ∇a,argmax)—because (q,x)= hypothesis ψ(δ,µ)= definition (∇a,argmax).
Smoothness That φ is C1 follows from its deﬁnition and that uh is C2,θ h is C1. That ψ is C1
follows from the implicit function theorem by a standard argument that we omit.
Now the
8Ωi s the closure of Ω.
9Proof. of theorem 2. Lemma 2 veriﬁes the hypothesis of lemma 1, so we deduce ψ(D×M)i s a s m o oth
manifold diﬀeomorphic to D × M, and φ |ψ(D×M): ψ(D × M) → D × M is a diﬀeomorphism. Suppose for a
moment that ψ(D × M)=T. Then we have deduced: T is a smooth manifold diﬀeomorphic to D × M,
and φ |T: T → D × M is a diﬀeomorphism, i.e. a global chart, completing the proof of theorem 2. (For the
proof of the statement about T s dimension, see the paragraph just after the statement of theorem 2.)
We justify our momentary supposition that ψ(D × M)=T.
The proof of lemma 2 shows ψ(D×M) ⊂ T (where ψ is shown well-deﬁned), so we show T ⊂ ψ(D×M),
by showing idT = ψ ◦φ |T . Fix (q,e) ∈ T.W r i te (δ,µ): =φ(q,e). We want ψ(δ,µ)=( q,e). That is, what
we want (by deﬁnition of ψ)i s( i ) q = ∇| e a and (ii) e = argmaxx∈Ω Σ(δhuh(xh) − µhxh).
We show (i). We know equation (θ) holds at any equilibrium allocation. Since (q,e) ∈ T,e is an
equilibrium allocation. Therefore equation (θ) holds at e : q = ∇h |eh a. Averaged, it implies q = ∇| e a.
We show (ii). Since (q,e) ∈ T,e is an equilibrium allocation, so by part (A) of proposition 1, e =
argmaxx∈Ω Wδ,µ(x) for (δ,µ): =φ(q,e).
Finally, we provide the





e ∈ Ω:∀h,eh = xh − ∆h for some ∆h ∈ span(W)

So ﬁbers are parameterized by an open set of ∆h>1 in span(W)H−1—here e1 = x1 +Σ h>1∆h—which is
a convex set of dimension (H − 1)J, depending smoothly on (q,e).
Finally, the
Proof. of corollary 2. Suppose x ∈ Ω, hence x   0. If it is an equilibrium allocation, then all
(∇h − ∇) |x∈ a⊥ according to part (B) of proposition 1. Conversely, if all (∇h − ∇) |x∈ a⊥, we want that
x is an equilibrium allocation, which by deﬁnition means that (q,x) ∈ T, i.e. θh(q,xh)=0 , for some asset
prices q ∈ Q. The choice q := ∇a works, and the argument for why it works, coincidentally, is exactly the
proof of part (A) of proposition 2.
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